

additional resources are needed in order to be able to answer the question at home in townhall meetings in Nebraska that that is what is needed to get the job done, then I hope the Congress will provide the Department of Defense with the resources and insist that the Department of Defense allocate in 1999 the resources in order to be able to get it done.

I have not read all of them, the three- or four- or five-part series in the Washington Post on the problem of drugs coming across the border—so-called. There is not much of a border between the United States and Mexico. It is over 2,000 miles. And from what I have seen down there, there is not much to let you know when you are in Mexico or in the United States. And there is a tremendous amount of truck and automobile traffic and an awful lot of resources and money behind the effort to get drugs into the United States.

It is corrupting Mexico, making it difficult for them to operate—an extremely violent world. And in this morning's paper, there is a story about Mr. Fuentes' doctors, three of whom were held responsible for his death, apparently, giving him a facelift or something so he would look a little different. They were found in concrete canisters along a road in Mexico.

These guys play for keeps. From their standpoint, it is a war. From their standpoint, they are deploying the maximum amount of resources, their considerable amount of wealth and resources.

Barry McCaffrey, a first-rate military officer, now our drug czar, when he says to me, "We need additional resources in order to be successful in these four areas," I pay attention to him. And I applaud his willingness to be able to come to the Department of Defense and to this Congress and say, "This is what we need to do in order to be successful."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that three documents be printed in the RECORD: One is the letter of November 6 that General McCaffrey sent to Secretary Cohen, and another is the document that indicates the additional resources that are needed, and the third is the "Legal Authority to De-Certify Agency Budgets."

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY,

Washington, DC, November 6, 1997.

Hon. WILLIAM S. COHEN,

Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, The Pentagon, Washington, DC.

DEAR SECRETARY COHEN: The National Narcotics Leadership Act requires that the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) review the drug budget of each department and certify whether the amount requested is adequate to implement the drug control program of the President. For FY 1999, the Department of Defense (DoD) has requested \$809 million for drug control programs, approximately the same level as FY

1998. After careful review, ONDCP has determined pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §1502(c)(3)(B) that this budget cannot be certified.

To correct the deficiencies in the current FY 1999 proposal, DoD needs to amend its FY 1999 budget to include an additional \$141 million in drug control initiatives, which will enhance operations in the Andes, Mexico, the Caribbean, and along our borders. Details associated with these amendments are highlighted in the enclosed document. Under 21 U.S.C. §1502(c)(5), DoD is required to include this additional funding in its FY 1999 submission to the Office of Management and Budget.

The support of the Department of Defense (DoD) is critical to achieving the goals of the National Drug Control Strategy. Appreciate your leadership of DoD's important counterdrug programs. The outstanding success of these missions in a credit to the dedicated men and women of our armed forces. Working together, the Executive Branch can structure a drug control budget which will reduce drug use and its consequences in America. Look forward to receiving the Department's amended FY 1999 budget proposal. Your support on this issue, which is so vital to our Nation's security and the health of our young people, is critical.

Respectfully,

BARRY R. MCCAFFREY,

Director.

FY 1999 DRUG CONTROL BUDGET AMENDMENTS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (AS REQUIRED BY 21 U.S.C. §1502(c)(5))

Andean Coca Reduction Initiative (+\$75 million). This initiative incorporates enforcement and interdiction measures that will disrupt the cocaine export industry. These efforts will include support for host nation programs to interdict the flow of coca base and cocaine in source countries, as well as expanded support to Peruvian and Colombian riverine interdiction programs.

Mexican Initiative (+\$24 million). This proposal will provide additional resources to reduce the flow of illicit drugs from Mexico into the United States and disrupt and dismantle criminal organizations engaging in drug trafficking and money laundering. This effort will help implement the Declaration of the Mexican-U.S. Alliance Against Drugs signed by President Zedillo and President Clinton on May 6, 1997. It will expand U.S. operational support to detection and monitoring missions in Mexican airspace and territorial seas, establish a joint law enforcement investigative capability in the Bilateral Border Task Forces, and aid the Mexican Government in developing a self-sustaining interdiction capability.

Caribbean Violent Crime and Regional Interdiction Initiative (+\$12 million). This effort will target drug trafficking-related criminal activities and violence in the Caribbean Region, including South Florida, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the independent states and territories of the Eastern Caribbean. This will implement commitments made by the President during the Caribbean Summit held in Barbados.

National Guard Counterdrug Operations (+\$30 million). These funds will partially restore reductions incurred since FY 1993 in State Plans funding, which includes support for counterdrug activities along the border.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY,

Washington, DC, November 6, 1997.

Memorandum for Director

Through: Chief of Staff

From: Charles Blanchard, Director, Office of Legal Counsel

LEGAL AUTHORITY TO DE-CERTIFY AGENCY BUDGETS

At your request, both General Counsel Judith Leonard and I independently reviewed ONDCP's statutes to determine our authority to certify national drug control agency budget.

It is our firm and considered legal opinion that the statute gives you two specific powers:

(1) The power to "certify in writing as to the adequacy of such [agency budget] request in whole or in part . . . and [should a budget not be certified] . . . include in the certification an initiative or funding level that would make this request adequate." [21 U.S.C. §1502(c)(3)(B)]; and

(2) The power to "request the head of a department or agency to include in the department's or agency's budget submission [to OMB] funding requests for specific initiatives that are consistent with the President's priorities for the National Drug Control Strategy" [21 U.S.C. §1502(c)(5)].

Most importantly, the statute makes quite clear that "the department or agency shall comply with such a [ONDCP] request." [21 U.S.C. §1502(c)(5)] In our view, this power to order an agency to place specific initiatives in the budget request is the most important power.

We have reviewed the proposed letter to the Secretary of Defense, and believe that it is fully consistent with this statute.

Mr. KERREY. I yield the floor.

Mr. BURNS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana.

EXTENSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the hour for morning business be continued until 6:30 p.m., this date, with Senators able to speak therein for up to 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BURNS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent my staffer, Bob Nickel, be permitted to be on the floor during this speech.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMENDING THE SENATE FOR ADDRESSING NATO ENLARGEMENT

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I wish to address the great efforts that this

Chamber has undertaken on the matter of NATO enlargement—the extension of the alliance membership to the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.

It is sometimes charged that Congress has provided serious consideration to this matter. Anyone who makes this argument has not paid attention to the legislation Congress passed on this matter over the last 3 years and have clearly ignored the activities of our committees, particularly the extensive amount of hearings that have been held over the last 2 months. Our leadership on both sides of the aisle is to be commended for the time and effort they have dedicated to this important matter.

Allow me to quickly review the highlights of Congress' role in the NATO enlargement issue. It is important to remember that Congress, in a most bipartisan manner, has led the charge for NATO enlargement.

In 1994, the 104th Congress, then led by a Democratic majority, passed the NATO Enlargement Participation Act, an initiative of then-Senator Hank Brown. This act not only endorsed NATO enlargement, but also called upon the President to establish programs to assist selected Central European democracies prepare for the burdens and responsibilities of alliance membership. This was a bipartisan initiative, one that found strong support in both parties. I might add that NATO enlargement was even a key pillar in the GOP's Contract With America.

In 1996, the Senate passed by recorded vote of 81-16 the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act, a bill that explicitly endorsed NATO membership for Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia.

This summer the alliance finally heeded the urging of Congress. Last July, at the Madrid summit, the North Atlantic Council invited Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to accession negotiations that will culminate in protocols of accessions that should be approved and signed this December at the annual NAC ministerial.

I might add that I had the honor serving as a member of the President's delegation to the Madrid summit along with Senators JOE BIDEN, GORDON SMITH, and BARBARA MIKULSKI. We attended in our capacity as members of the Senate's NATO Observer Group. Our role in this historic summit reflected the bipartisan support behind NATO's policy of enlargement and the degree of consultation and communication occurring on this issue between Congress and the administration.

Since the Madrid summit, and particularly over the last 2 months, this Chamber has focused on NATO enlargement in a manner I believe unprecedented for any realm of issues. I and Senator JOE BIDEN have had the privilege of facilitating 16 NATO Observer Group meetings with administration officials, experts, and foreign officials including NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana.

I want to especially commend the leadership of the Senate committees, whose statutory jurisdictions are far broader, for directing so much of their energies to this matter.

Over the last 2 months alone, the Foreign Relations Committee, the Appropriations Committee, and the Senate Budget Committee have held a total of nine hearings on NATO enlargement. They have addressed such issues as the geopolitical rational behind this initiative, the affect it has on Russia's evolution as international actor and as a democracy, the financial costs, and the military implications, among other issues, and the pro's and con's that one hears on these matters.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a list of the meetings and hearings that have been conducted by these three Senate committees on NATO enlargement.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SENATE COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT

October 7: Senate Foreign Relations Committee begins hearing on NATO expansion. Strategic Rationale of NATO Enlargement with Madeleine Albright.

October 9: Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on NATO Enlargement. Pros and Cons of NATO Enlargement with Senator Roth, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Michael Mandelbaum and Jonathan Dean.

October 21: Appropriations Committee hearing on NATO Enlargement. NATO Enlargement Costs with Madeleine Albright and William Cohen.

October 22: Appropriations Hearing on NATO Enlargement. NATO Enlargement Costs and DoD Readiness Impact with Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff General Hugh Shelton and SACEUR General Wes Clark.

October 23: Appropriations Committee Hearing on NATO Enlargement. GAO Studies on NATO Enlargement Costs with Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller General, General Accounting Office.

October 28: Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on NATO Enlargement. Costs, Benefits and Burden Sharing of NATO Enlargement.

October 29: Budget Committee hearing on NATO Enlargement. NATO/EMU Costs with James Baker and Susan Eisenhower.

October 30: Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on NATO Enlargement. NATO-Russia Relations with Henry Kissinger.

November 5: Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on NATO Enlargement. Public Views on NATO Enlargement.

Mr. ROTH. These hearings have been conducted to the highest standard. They have addressed the most contentious and potentially divisive dimensions of NATO enlargement. They have provided a powerful podium for skeptics and for those who simply want to be sure that all the "i's" have been dotted.

Mr. President, I firmly believe that NATO enlargement will yield a stronger alliance, a more peaceful and more stable Europe, and a Europe that will be an even more effective partner for the United States in a world where our

shared interests are increasingly global in nature.

I am not going to burden this Chamber with another rendition of why I support NATO enlargement.

However, I have followed these hearings closely, and I would like to address what I think one should draw from their deliberations on three of the most important issues of NATO enlargement: the cost; its relationship to America's global interests; and, the future of Russia.

Costs has been the most debated dimension of NATO enlargement. However, the Senate's examination of this issue so far leaves me even more confident that this will be a most worthwhile investment.

Earlier this year, the President, at the request of Congress, estimated that NATO enlargement will cost the United States some \$100-200 million per year over the next decade.

Last month, Secretary Cohen and Secretary Albright testified to the Appropriations Committee that the costs to the United States may be less because some if not much of the infrastructure existing in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary is more capable than previously estimated.

More detail on the costs of NATO enlargement is an urgent priority. NATO will soon complete its own estimate of the costs of integrating the three nations. This report is due before the December NAC ministerial. It is imperative that this study is fully transparent, clear, and specific.

With that said, even if NATO enlargement were to cost the United States some \$500 million a year over the decade, that yearly cost would still amount to about a quarter of the cost of one B-2 bomber. That is not a bad deal considering the gains we will attain in solidifying peace and stability in post-cold-war Europe.

The Senate hearings have also reaffirmed my confidence that NATO enlargement will enhance America's ability to secure its vital interest around the globe—not just those in Europe.

NATO enlargement is critical step toward a more unified and more peaceful Europe. It is, thus, fundamental to Europe's evolution into a partner that will more effectively meet global challenges before to the transatlantic community. An undivided Europe at peace is a Europe that will be better able to look outward, a Europe better able to join with the United States to address necessary global security concerns. A partnership with an undivided Europe in the time-tested architecture of NATO will enable the United States to more effectively meet the global challenges to its vital interests at time when our defense resources are increasingly strained.

This was a, if not the, central theme of former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's recent presentation before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. To use his words:

NATO expansion is central to the vitality of the European-American connection, to the

scope of a secure and democratic Europe, and to the ability of the America and Europe to work together in promoting international security.

European instability, which is inherently more likely should we fail to extend Alliance membership to the democracies of Central Europe, portends to be the greatest of drains upon U.S. defense resources, energy, and effort. This has already proven to be the case in Bosnia. We must take the pro-active steps necessary to consolidate and widen the zone of security and, thus, peace and stability in Europe. NATO enlargement is the most effective step we can take toward this end.

Third, these Senate hearings have constructively and aggressively addressed concerns that have been voiced about the potential impact of NATO enlargement upon Russia's future.

Testimony from Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering, our former Ambassador to Moscow, emphasized that NATO enlargement has not produced a revanchist Russian foreign policy nor undercut democracy in Russia. In fact, let me quote directly from Ambassador Pickering's testimony.

He stated:

Over the last 18 months, precisely, when NATO enlargement has been a salient point of our agenda, Russian reform and security cooperation have moved forward, not backward.

This former ambassador to Russia added that in the course of NATO enlargement, Yeltsin was reelected as Russia's president and that since then he has elevated reformers in his government. Moreover, Yeltsin has appointed a new defense minister, one who publicly supports START II. Most importantly, last May Russia signed the Founding Act, an agreement that offers an unprecedented opportunity for a new era of cooperation and partnership between the Alliance and Russia.

Mr. President, too many times this year Congress has been accused of paying inadequate attention to the policy of NATO enlargement. The fact is that Congress has aggressively addressed this matter. Congress has not only been engaged in this policy its bipartisan leadership on this matter has actually been a catalyst of action.

Much commendation is due to the Senate leadership and the Chamber as a whole for the sustained attention that has been directed to the many facets of this issue. The amount of consultation that has occurred between the administration and Congress makes NATO enlargement a model of how to approach the executive-legislative dimension of U.S. security policy.

I fully recognize that our deliberations on NATO enlargement are far from over. More hearings are sure to be held on this important policy, as they should be. However, I thought it important to highlight the tremendously effective efforts that this Chamber has already directed to this matter of national security.

SENATOR BIDEN'S NATO SPEECH

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, our colleague, Senator JOE BIDEN, addressed the Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council, the so called NAC, during their visit to the United States last month. His speech was an impressive overview of the state of debate here in the United States on NATO enlargement and how that debate is being affected the debate in Europe on issues of transatlantic security. Among these are, of course, the effort to foster reconciliation and peace in the Balkans.

The next coming months will feature a number of important events concerning NATO enlargement, including the NAC ministerial in mid-December which will yield protocols of accession into NATO for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

Keeping in mind the debate that we will have early next year on NATO enlargement, I encourage my colleagues to read Senator BIDEN's statement. It is one that should also be closely read by our colleagues in the executive branch.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator BIDEN's outstanding speech on NATO enlargement be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RATIFICATION OF NATO ENLARGEMENT BY THE U.S. SENATE

(By Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.)

I am honored by the invitation of the North Atlantic Council to share my thoughts on the American side of one of the most important foreign policy decisions that our alliance has faced for many decades: ratification of the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

First, let me make clear that I am a strong proponent of NATO enlargement. In the interest of brevity, and because there is no need to persuade this audience, I will not go into the details of my rationale.

Let me just say I believe the case for enlargement is overwhelmingly persuasive. First, it is my belief that the inclusion of the three aforementioned countries—if they meet all of NATO's rigid political, military, and economic criteria—would strengthen the alliance and enhance the security of the United States.

Second, the consequences if we fail to act are equally serious. The history of the twentieth century has taught us that if the United States distances itself from European affairs, the result on the continent is instability leading to chaos. Ultimately, dealing with the instability and chaos will cost far more in blood and treasure than the initial costs of staying engaged.

Finally, there is the moral factor. As Secretary of State Albright noted in her testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

What possible justification can there be for confirming the old cold war division of Europe by freezing out the new democracies east of Germany?

As most of you know, according to the U.S. Constitution, international treaties must be ratified by a two-thirds majority in the Senate. In this case, we would be ratifying an amendment to the Treaty of Washington of

1949. As the Democratic party's chief foreign policy spokesman in the Senate, I have the responsibility to lead the fight for ratification.

Despite what I believe to be the overwhelming logic for NATO enlargement, ratification will not be easy—it will not be a "slam dunk," as we say in this country. It will be considered, not only in the context of national security policy, but in the context of domestic politics.

And in the context of our debate about engagement versus isolationism. I know most of you are primarily concerned with military matters. But I hope you will convey to the civilian and political leaders in each of your countries the kinds of issues that could derail ratification in the U.S. Senate—to the detriment of all of us.

My principal reasons for being cautious about NATO enlargement revolve around two sides of the same issue: burden-sharing. The first side relates to sharing the costs of NATO enlargement; the second side relates to sharing the military duties in Bosnia.

Contrary to assertions by some European politicians, these cost and burden-sharing issues are not superficial problems. They have direct relevance, not only to the ratification of enlargement, but also to the kind of alliance we will have in the 21st century.

First the costs. There has been a good deal of publicity in the United States about three widely differing cost estimates of NATO enlargement. NATO's own cost-estimate—mandated by the North Atlantic Council at last July's Madrid summit—will not be known until just before the December NATO ministerial. So any firm predictions about how that will come out would be risky and premature.

Nonetheless, the latest estimate from the Clinton administration, offered this week in testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, was somewhat reassuring. It appears that the NATO estimate may be somewhat lower than the Pentagon's earlier study because only three—not four—countries are to be added to the alliance, and some of their militaries are in a bit better shape than previously thought.

Whatever the final numbers, the atmospherics of the debate over cost-sharing since Madrid have been damaging to Trans-Atlantic solidarity. Public statements from West European leaders that their countries should not—or even will not—pay any additional costs for enlargement given potent ammunition both to neo-isolationists in the U.S. Senate and to those who favor engagement but who have legitimate questions about costs.

Although there have been many warnings in the United States about the possibly huge costs of NATO enlargement, to my knowledge not a single American politician has said that we will not pay our share if enlargement is ratified. Yet when European leaders—before even waiting for the official NATO cost-study to come out in December—threaten not to pay even one additional franc or mark for enlargement, it is waving a red flag in front of my colleagues in the Senate.

Many of my fellow Senators are aware of the fact that West Europeans face competing priorities. We know that the eleven European NATO members who are also members of the European Union are currently engaged in painful budget cutting in order to meet the criteria for a single currency, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) on January 1, 1999. And we are aware that Germany and others are insisting that those countries who qualify be held to rigid fiscal discipline thereafter through a so-called "stability pact" without "political" criteria.